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Abstract 
I examine three main topics. The first is organized violence in the name of reli-
gion. I focus on collective violence by groups whose members share a religious 
affiliation. Having a taxonomy that distinguishes collective violence in the name 
of religion from other cases (e.g. an abortion clinic bomber) is important, because 
the causes of violence in the name of religion vary by type and by context. The 
second topic is how to frame collective violence in the name of religion. Should 
we focus on theology, religious convictions, or religious doctrine? Should we dis-
count religious doctrine as a variable altogether? Or should we characterize reli-
gion as about identity, a source of community allegiances, and group affiliation? I 
argue that when we adopt the label ‘religious violence’ and apply it to organized 
violence, one of our central focuses should be on ways that religion is an identity. 
Thirdly, I present a short case study that considers collective violence by Uighur 
Muslims in northwest China, Xinjiang province. This example is helpful because it 
illustrates that the identity approach is well suited to navigate some hard ques-
tions about how to classify (i.e., as religious, as ethnic, as a response to political 
domination, etc.) organized violence in the name of religion.  
Keywords: Religious Violence, Identity, Collective Violence, Intersectionality, 
Xinjiang 
 
Introduction 
There are a number of competing accounts of violence in the name of religion. One well-
known example is the civilization thesis.1 On this view attitudes about the relationship be-
tween political and religious authority, a propensity to violence in the name of religion, and 
commitments to authoritarian or democratic politics, reflect the dominant religious traditions 
that inform the collective identity of a society. This view also holds that conflict between ir-
reconcilable religious traditions is a major source of violence. Another view, defended by the 
New Atheists,2 holds that the non-rational nature of religious convictions, in particular the 
priority of faith over reason, inspires adherents of religious traditions to commit violence on 
                                                            
1   Samuel Huntington, “Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs (Summer, 1993). 
2   Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Religion, Terror, and the Future of Reason (New York, London: W.W. Norton, 
2005). 
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the basis of a blind obedience to a conception of religious authority. Both of these views as-
sign causation to religion to explain violence in the name of religion. By contrast, others 
claim that the very idea of religious violence is problematic, because its rests upon vague or 
poorly defined concepts. According to one account, the very idea of religious violence is 
mostly a myth.3 The current ideological frame for demarcating the secular from the religious 
is an artifact of the modern nation state and other historically contingent factors. This is said 
to undermine the idea of religious violence as defended by those aligned with the civilization-
al approach and New Atheism.   
In this paper I defend an alternative to these views on religious violence. The label re-
ligious violence is sometimes apt, yet it is a great oversimplification to assign causation to 
religious doctrine or religious conviction whenever violence in the name of religion occurs.  
According to what I will call the identity approach, human identity impacts human agency in 
ways that reflect many kinds of value commitments, including religious, political, and cultur-
al.  These value commitments can trigger violent responses based on perceived threats to a 
collective identity. The identity approach offers a more plausible framework for understand-
ing collective and organized violence in the name of religion compared to the other views that 
I consider. It is not, however, a general theory of violence in the name of religion. Though I 
do not rule out a priori that one could develop a plausible general theory of violence in the 
name of religion, we should exercise skepticism about generalities when investigating the 
phenomenon of religious violence. For example, the role that religion plays in a campaign for 
national liberation against a foreign occupation may differ in significant ways from the role 
religion plays in inter-religious violence between groups whose religious identity strongly 
correlates with ethnic identity. Moreover, given the politically charged nature of debates on 
religious violence, it is important to avoid the pitfalls of hypotheses on religious violence that 
serve political aims rather than an effort to understand the causes of a complex issue. 
By section the paper is organized as follows. First, I present the idea of collective vio-
lence in the name of religion. I focus on violence by groups whose members share a religious 
affiliation. I consider some competing ways we might frame collective violence in the name 
of religion. Should we consider such violence as a product of non-rational metaphysical con-
victions as the New Atheists suggest we should? Is it a fair characterization of Christian doc-
trine that it contains incipient Lockean notions about the relationship between political and 
religious authority, whereas other religious traditions, such as Islam, lack such a doctrinal 
basis for the modern liberal state? This is a central thesis of the civilizational approach.4  In 
the second section I defend the identity approach to collective violence in the name of reli-
gion. In the third section I offer a brief case study that considers collective violence by Uighur 
Muslims in Xinjiang, China. This example is helpful for several reasons. First, Uighur identi-
ty in contemporary China is a composite of ethnic, religious, and linguistic identity markers. 
Since all three forms of identity – ethnicity, religion, linguistic – face significant levels of 
oppression by the Chinese state, violence in response to such oppression cannot in any 
straightforward sense be called, ‘Muslim violence’.  Second, the levels of oppression against a 
                                                            
3   William Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious Violence: Secular Ideology and the Roots of Conflict (Oxford, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
4   For an excellent critique of this view, see Alfred Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the ‘Twin Tolerations’,” 
Journal of Democracy (11:4, 2000), pp. 37-57. 
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religious and ethnic minority in Xinjiang represent a paradigm example of how collective 
violence is a response to repression. And third, collective violence by Uighur Muslims in Xin-
jiang offers a helpful illustration of the identity approach to violence in the name of religion. I 
conclude in section IV. 
 
I. Collective violence in the name of religion 
Not all violence in the name of religion is collective. The Tsarnaev brothers [i.e. Boston Mar-
athon Bombers], an abortion clinic bomber, a religious migrant in a diaspora community, or 
an individual who is ‘radicalized’ by social media, can commit violence in the name of reli-
gion that is not collective violence. A general theory of violence in the name of religion would 
examine these and many other types of cases. Yet an important first step requires having a 
taxonomy that distinguishes collective violence in the name of religion from these other cases.  
Variables that we need to consider when thinking about violence in the name of reli-
gion include: geopolitics; the intersection of religious with other identity markers such as eth-
nicity; the intersection of religious identity and political grievances (e.g. the U.S. and British 
sponsorship of the coup that overthrew the democratically elected president of Iran in 1953 
remains a focal point in contemporary Iranian politics); military occupation; and the strong 
correlation between repressive state religion policies and violence in the name of religion.5 
These factors contribute to violence in the name of religion in different ways in different con-
texts. Therefore, the very idea of ‘religious violence’ is hopelessly vague unless formulated in 
a way that carefully distinguishes these and other relevant variables, as well as noting the in-
teraction effects between salient variables. 
In On Violence Hannah Arendt offered the following observation, 
 
It is…a rather sad reflection on the present state of political science that our terminology does not 
distinguish among such key words as “power,” “strength,” “force,” “authority,” and finally “vio-
lence-all of which refer to distinct phenomena… To use them as synonyms not only indicates a 
certain deafness to linguistic meanings, which would be serious enough, but it has also resulted in 
a kind of blindness to the realities they correspond to.6  
 
Arendt’s comments are helpful for two reasons. One is that taxonomy matters to how we 
think about violence in the name of religion for reasons just mentioned: some violence in the 
name of religion is collective, some is not; and the causes of violence in the name of religion 
in one context can differ significantly from other contexts. Second, how we frame violence in 
the name of religion will, for good or for ill, orient our judgments about what counts as evi-
dence for what we are trying to explain.   
Four framing strategies for understanding violence in the name of religion can be 
evaluated in light of Arendt’s comments: 1) New Atheism; 2) the civilizational approach; 3) 
the myth of religious violence; and 4) the identity approach to organized violence in the name 
of religion. In the remainder of this section I briefly summarize each. 
                                                            
5   See for example, Brian Grimm and Roger Finke, The Price of Freedom Denied: Religious Persecution and 
Conflict in the Twenty-First Century (Cambridge University Press, 2011). 
Hannah Arendt, On Violence (New York, London: Harcourt Press, 1970), p. 43. There is a nice discussion of this 
passage in John D. Carlson’s, “Religion and Violence: Coming to Terms with Terms,” The Blackwell Com-
panion to Religion and Violence, Andrew Murphy (ed.) ( Blackwell, 2011): (7-22), p. 15. 
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According to Sam Harris religion is, “the most prolific source of violence in our histo-
ry.”7 He also claims that, “…faith is precisely what differentiates every Muslim from every 
infidel. Without faith, most Muslim grievances against the West become impossible even to 
formulate, much less avenge.”8 This view assigns causation to religious faith, which in turn is 
construed as an irrational source of belief formation. On this view, faith is immune to salient 
evidence that might undermine a religious conviction, a source for dogmatism, and a well-
spring for all manner of delusions and fantasies. Harris’ view is that that religious belief and 
doctrine beget violence.  
In “The Clash of Civilizations?” Samuel Huntington famously claims,  
 
It is my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new [post-Cold-War] world will 
not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the 
dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors 
in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups 
of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines 
between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.9 
 
Civilizations on this view define and demarcate identities, which in turn serve as the basis for 
competing ways of organizing government and society. Conflict emerges from relations be-
tween powers that represent different civilizational identities. Civilizational identities overlap 
with nation states, the political units that embody the power that expresses civilizational iden-
tities. This view differs from that of the New Atheists, in part because it claims that not all 
religious identities are sources of non-rational convictions that give rise to intolerance and 
fanaticism.  Partly for this reason, the civilizational approach has gained traction among the 
American Christian right, many members of whom claim that non-Christian forms of reli-
gious identity, in particular Islam, are incompatible with democratic political values. 
In his recent book, The Myth of Religious Violence William Cavanaugh argues that 
there are no trans-historical or essential properties to religious belief, doctrine, or identity. We 
lack an account of necessary and sufficient conditions for something to qualify as religious. 
Therefore, “[w]ithout a clear distinction between what is religious and what is not religious, 
any argument that religion per se does or does not cause violence becomes hopelessly arbi-
trary.”10 On this view, what we now call religion is an artifact, somewhat like the national 
identities that are artifacts of the modern nation state. Those who attribute causal powers to 
religion by contrast assume that religion, like a natural kind, has essential properties that can 
be clearly delineated. Such properties are said to have causal powers all by themselves, inde-
pendently of confounding variables or other possible explanations. Yet if we don’t have a 
stable conception of what counts as ‘religion’ that view is unsupportable. Cavanaugh’s thesis 
is motivated largely by skepticism towards prevailing accounts of religious violence. 
                                                            
7   Sam Harris, The End of Faith: Terror, and the Future of Reason, quoted in Cavanaugh, The Myth of Religious 
Violence, p. 212. 
8   Harris, quoted in Cavanaugh, p. 213. 
9“ Clash of Civilizations?”, p. 1. 
10 Cavanaugh, p. 21. 
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In stressing the idea of religion as about identity, a fourth position endorses what is 
sometimes called a functional approach to understanding religion. Emile Durkheim’s The 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life11 is the most famous example of a work that defends this 
view. On Durkheim’s view, 
 
a religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is, things set 
apart and surrounded by prohibitions—beliefs and practices that unite its adherents in a single 
community….[A] second element…is not less essential than the first: demonstrating that the idea 
of religion…must be something eminently collective.12 
 
The identity approach also informs a number contemporary positions ranging across disci-
plines from social science, anthropology, and moral psychology.13 One thing these views have 
in common is the conviction that religious identity is a composite of multiple factors, includ-
ing: religious doctrine, culture, historical memory, and political allegiances, among others. 
What in contemporary parlance is called intersectionality, or the idea that human identity is a 
composite of multiple factors, is central to this way of thinking about religious identity.   
Notice that if we do not heed Arendt’s warning, we won’t have a reliable means of ad-
judicating the merits of these incompatible positions on violence in the name of religion. This 
is a compelling reason to stipulate which kind of violence in the name of religion we hope to 
understand. Here the focus is on collective violence.   
In The Politics of Collective Violence14 Charles Tilly has given us a useful taxonomy 
for types of collective violence. Tilly distinguishes brawls, scattered attacks, sabotage, riots, 
violence that emerges from broken negotiations, as well as campaigns of organized collective 
violence. Making progress in understanding the significance of collective violence depends in 
part on being able to isolate what triggers a gun fight between cowboys over a card game 
from what triggers interreligious violence between Hindus and Muslims in modern India. 
Likewise if the Kurdish PKK in eastern Turkey is supported in part by agents who harbor 
grievances about past promises that have been reneged (e.g. promises to negotiate on fair 
terms by the Turkish state, promises by the American government to support an independent 
state), then what Tilly terms broken negotiations will be an important factor in that conflict. It 
may be that triggers for organized violence in one context appear in organized violence of 
another, but that cannot be settled a priori. To make progress here we need to examine multi-
ple contexts, such as interreligious violence in a new post-colonial state, violence between a 
                                                            
11 Emile Durkheim, Elementary Forms of Religious Life, trans. by Carol Cosman (New York, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1912/2008). 
12 Durkheim, p. 46. 
13 Jonathan Haidt explicitly defends a version of the functionalist approach in, “Religion is a Team Sport,” The 
Righteous Mind: Why Good People are Divided by Politics and Religion (New York: Pantheon Books, 2012), 
pp. 246-273. David Sloan Wilson adapts some features to the functionalist approach in Darwin’s Cathedral: 
Evolution, Religion, and the Nature of Society (Chicago, London: University of Chicago Press, 2002). Tim 
Crane offers a number of interesting ideas on religion as identity in The Meaning of Belief: Religion from an 
Atheist’s Point of View (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017). And Asef Bayet in Making Islam 
Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-Islamist Turn (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007) 
emphasizes ways that religious identity is informed by interpretive practices that vary by cultural, national and 
regional contexts. Rezi Aslan also emphasizes ways that religion is an identity in his new book, God: A Hu-
man History (New York: Random House, 2017). 
14 Charles Tilly, The Politics of Collective Violence (Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004). 
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new religious group and members of a dominant religious identity, violence in the name of 
religion that follows a military invasion by a foreign state, or a charismatic religious leader 
who calls for mass violence.   
Violence in the name of religion can take these among many other forms, ranging 
from al-Qaeda sponsored terrorism, to organized violence by mainline Protestant Christians 
against Mormons in 19th C America, to a resistance movement composed mainly of Muslims 
against French Occupation in Algeria, or Buddhists fighting Hindu soldiers in Sri Lanka. 
Each of these cases can be classified as violence in the name of religion. Yet ‘religious vio-
lence’ is not a very helpful label if we consider each of these cases without trying to identify 
the causes that trigger them. The predominately Muslim members of FLN who waged a vio-
lent campaign against the French government in Algeria often invoked religious values to 
mobilize support for their cause.  Yet given all the factors in play, the label, ‘war for inde-
pendence’ is more apt than ‘religious violence’. Likewise, the sarin gas attack by members of 
Aum Shirinko in a Tokyo subway were conducted by agents who had considerably different 
motives than the 9/11 attackers who represented al-Qaeda.15 So one distinction worth paying 
attention to is violence in the name of religion that lacks a political goal and violence in the 
name of religion that has a political goal.  Moreover, once we settle on a classification of vio-
lence in the name of a political goal there are further questions about causation. It may turn 
out that the propaganda expressed by a group presents religious values as the primary ra-
tionale for collective violence, when in actuality the intersection of political variables, such as 
domination, repression, and resistance, are more salient causes.  
Tilly’s work is important for my project in part because he sharpens the taxonomical 
options for how we classify violence in the name of religion. Taking his taxonomical concerns 
as a cue, my focus is on one species of violence in the name of religion; namely, organized 
violence by groups. To be sure, this category has fuzzy edges, as well as paradigm cases. A 
suicide bombing campaign by the Tamil Tigers or a terror campaign by the FLN in the war 
for independence in Algeria are paradigm cases. A knife assault on a police checkpoint by 20 
Uighur men by comparison might look more like a scattered attack or a riot. Yet if there are a 
sufficient number of such attacks over an extended period of time, depending on the relevant 
variables (e.g. internal colonialism by the Chinese state, material and moral support from the 
Uighur diaspora community outside China, ethnic, religions and linguistic differences be-
tween Uighur and Han Chinese), there may be good reasons to classify this as organized and 
not just collective violence.  
Matters are in fact more complicated than the brief characterizations here suggest.  For 
instance, for some questions, we need hypotheses that test for multi-causation. This is true of 
individual case studies (e.g. interreligious violence between Sunni Muslims and Coptic Chris-
tians in Egypt, or Sunni Muslims and Orthodox Christians in the Balkans, etc.) as well as 
comparative studies (e.g. violence between religious groups in democratic and in authoritarian 
states). The identity approach is intended to offer partial insights into a complex phenomenon.  
                                                            
15 Steve Clark, The Justification of Religious Violence (Malden, MA; Oxford, UK: Blackwell, 2014). 
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II. How to Frame Collective Violence in the Name of Religion 
Some ways of framing organized violence in the name of religion render causes invisible, 
produce false positives, reinforce confirmation biases, or serve a political agenda. Consider 
the claim that people join al-Qaeda because they hate the freedom enjoyed by American citi-
zens. Assigning the label ‘religious violence’ is one thing; properly identifying causes for 
such violence is another. When we adopt the descriptor ‘religious violence’ and apply it to 
organized violence, in some contexts it is helpful to examine ways that religion is an identity.  
In this section I present the argument in favor of the identity approach. 
The identity approach emphasizes unifying and exclusionary characteristics of reli-
gious identity. Religion unites by forging shared community identities but also excludes by 
demarcating non-members. This way of thinking about religion is important to questions 
about religious violence because it helps us see that organized violence is often triggered by 
perceived threats to a shared identity. In this respect, religious identity like ethnicity and na-
tionality, can mobilize groups to support violence.   
One of the best studies on collective violence in the name of religion is Robert Pape’s 
Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism.16 Pape’s central thesis is, 
 
The bottom line is that suicide terrorism is mainly a response to foreign occupation. Isolated inci-
dents in other circumstances do occur. However, modern suicide terrorism is best understood as an 
extreme response strategy for national liberation against democracies with troops that pose an im-
manent threat to control the territory the terrorist view as their homeland.17 
 
On Pape’s view, political occupation plays a greater role in motivating support for suicide 
bombing campaigns than religious belief. His data set for this claim includes every known 
suicide bombing from 1980-2003.   
Here is a condensed synopsis of Pape’s research, 
 
1. In well over 90% of all cases—across states and across religious identities, the best explanation 
for what motivates support for a suicide bombing campaign is that such violence is believed to be 
an effective means to a political end. Religion mobilizes support. But religion is not the trigger. 
Nor is it the end. Occupation is the cause; freedom from occupation is the end. 
2. Democracies are more vulnerable to suicide attack, because their constituencies can more easily 
pressure political elites to withdraw from a conflict.   
3. Religion is a variable, but mainly when there is a religious difference between occupied and oc-
cupier.  This factor suggests that we should pay at least as much attention to perceived threats to a 
community identity as to the religious composition of a group that supports suicide terrorism.  
 
Democracies with militaries perceived as occupiers are more likely to be targeted by suicide 
bombing campaigns, because such campaigns are political strategies and democratic states are 
more likely to change tactics in response. Since political elites in authoritarian states are not 
answerable to public opinion to the same extent, their survival as elites and perceived legiti-
macy does not depend on domestic pressure, such as mass protests against a military cam-
paign abroad. 
                                                            
16 Robert Pape, Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2006). 
17 Dying to Win, p. 23. 
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Consider also for example a post-colonial struggle by a colonized group whose reli-
gious identity differs from that of the colonial power. Should we characterize violence by the 
National Liberation Front in the Algerian war for independence as collective religious vio-
lence or a political struggle for independence? The French massacred thousands, and tortured 
many.18 When religious identity converts political grievances (e.g. against oppression) into a 
narrative of struggle against a foreign power, violence in the name of religion is not straight-
forwardly religious violence.  
The social science research identifies ways that the configuration of identity markers 
within groups and between groups is relevant to whether collective violence in the name of 
religion is likely to occur. Philosophical accounts of identity can make a helpful contribution 
in this context. Consider the intersectionality problem. Identity is a composite whose elements 
typically include nationality, ethnicity, language(s), historical memory, political affiliation, 
and religion or non-religion. What some call ‘religious violence’ to designate violence in the 
name of religion might have a political cause or may be a response to a perceived threat to 
multiple overlapping identity markers, including ethnicity and religion. The religion as identi-
ty approach will not tell us everything about organized violence in the name of religion, but it 
does offer a perspective that is helpful in bringing to light factors that are ignored by other 
accounts of violence in the name of religion. 
The composition of human identity is intersectional: ethnicity, language, religion, po-
litical affiliation, nationality, profession, hobbies; all of these contribute to a person’s identity 
in the sense of shaping what matters to her and why. Intersectionality poses a problem for 
explanations of organized violence in part because this fact about human identity makes it 
difficult to identity the primary motives that trigger organized violence. It is true that some 
identity markers play a more significant role in collective violence than others. Collective 
violence in the name of the nation or of a religion is more likely than collective violence in 
the name of the Andrie Tarkovsky Film Society or the International Cricket Fan Club.   
Yet even if we settle the issue of which identity markers do and which do not have the 
potential to enjoin support for collective violence, questions remain. Collective violence 
might have a political end, yet circumstances might be such that framing the discourse in 
terms of religion is more effective as a means to that political end. Why should we expect 
discourses that seek a justification for collective violence to be any less prone to self-serving 
strategies or even self-deception than any other discourse in which power is a central con-
cern?   
Likewise, the intersection of religious and political affiliation, for example, can render 
an agent’s religious identity apt to be influenced by her political affiliation, or vice versa. Eth-
nicity may be relevant too. An obvious example is white Protestant identity in the context of 
American politics. A white American with a Protestant religious identity may have a 
Protestant religious identity that differs significantly from that of a German Protestant, or a 
Latina American Protestant, or African American Protestant.19 In some contexts, invoking the 
identity marker ‘Protestant’ will be less informative than invoking a composition of identity 
                                                            
18 For a detailed account, see Alistair Home, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York Review 
Books Classics, 2006). 
19 See Christian Smith and Michael Emerson, Divided by Faith: Evangelical Religion and the Problem of Race 
in America (Oxford, UK; New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2000). 
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markers, or even just non-religious identity makers. For example, in the American context it 
may turn out that being white is a better predictor of one’s conception of religion and politics 
than being Protestant.  
The New Atheists claim that non-rational religious convictions, rather than perceived 
threats to identity, cause violence in the name of religion. The evidence suggests that this 
claim is false. The civilizational approach does emphasis identity, and does not in principle 
suffer from an anti-religious bias. Yet this view construes identity in ways that are not fine 
grained enough.  For instance, generalizations such as ‘western Christianity’ or ‘Confucian 
identity’ are useful for some purposes, such as understanding broad historical trends or the 
historical roots to self-understanding among large groups of persons. Yet collective violence 
in the name of religion occurs in many different contexts and under many different political 
conditions. On this measure, the civilizational approach overgeneralizes to the point of offer-
ing a very poor explanation of collective violence in the name of religion. It characterizes 
political conflicts, such as a war for independence between Algerian Muslims and the French 
colonial state, as a ‘clash of civilizational identities’. Yet Algerian Muslims were motivated to 
participate in collective violence against the French colonial state, not because they are Mus-
lims, but because they wanted to resist oppression. Moreover, despite the fact that Cavanaugh 
makes an important contribution insofar as he offers compelling rebuttals to the New Atheist 
and the civilizational approaches, he has not shown that the idea of religious violence is a 
myth. A better characterization is to claim that collective violence in the name of religion is 
complicated, stemming as it does from multiple variables that intersect in ways that vary by 
context. The case of collective violence by Uighurs in contemporary China is one illustration 
of this. 
 
III. Collective Violence in Xinjiang 
In Northwest China, Xinjiang province, Uighur, face extreme repression by the Chinese state.  
Despite the many falsehoods that stand behind the ‘one China’ policy, according to which 
China is a unified state in which all citizens are equal, the reality is that China is a multicul-
tural and multi-religious society whose state policies promote a conception of national identi-
ty that is mostly opposed to this diversity. Uighur citizens are mostly Hanafi Sunni Muslims. 
Uighur is a Turkic language, and Uighur society is distinct from the Han dominated concep-
tion of Chinese citizenship that stands behind official state policy.  It is true that some conces-
sions have been granted to Uighurs in China. For instance, during the era of the ‘one-child’ 
policy Uighur were given an exemption. Yet the rationale for this was reasons of state power, 
in particular conflict reduction, not accommodation of distinct religious or cultural practices. 
As Bovingdon puts it in The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land, 
 
…even though Uyghurs have expressed deep dissatisfaction with governance in Xinjiang and 
pointedly called for policy changes, Beijing…[has]almost never responded by accommodating 
those demand or entertaining public discussions of the concerns. Instead, officials have strength-
ened unpopular policies and cracked down on both political speech and spaces for assembly out-
side party control.20 
                                                            
20 Gardner Bovingdon, The Uyghurs: Strangers in Their Own Land (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2010), Kindle Version, Loc 2496. 
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Given these contextually relevant factors we can ask, is organized violence in this context 
religious, interethnic, mostly a political response to oppression, or triggered by some combi-
nation of these or other factors? A brief look at the occasional organized violence committed 
by Uighurs in Xinjiang will help guide our thinking about how to answer this question.21  
The following list of some major incidents in the past ten years is helpful for context, 
 
July 2009: significant protests by Uighurs in Urumqi resulted in 140 deaths22 
July 2013: a car with several passengers drove into a group of pedestrians at Tiananmen Square 
killing 2 and injuring nearly 4023  
March 2014: a group of Uighurs armed with knives attacked civilians at a train station killing 2924 
August 2014: three armed Uighurs killed a controversial imam in Kashgar outside the famous Id 
Kah Mosque in Kashgar; many believed the imam was too supportive of the Chinese Communist 
Party and its repressive policies25 
December 2016: a group of assailants attacked a regional Communist party office, detonating a 
bomb26 
 
This partial list includes collective violence by groups of individuals who may not have had 
any affiliation with known groups, as well as violence that known groups—e.g. The East Tur-
kestan Liberation Organization—took credit for. Some acts of violence in the name of Uighur 
identity were likely well coordinated while others where by comparison more spontaneous.   
Though not a totally neutral description, for starters let’s call this violence in the name 
of Uighur identity. So how might we move beyond a general label, ‘Uighur violence’ to one 
that helps us understand why there is organized violence in Xinjiang? Here is a plausible per-
spective. Consider the following: the mass surveillance state in Xinjiang imposes a level of 
repression that exceeds the authoritarianism in most other Chinese provinces, as well as near-
ly every other authoritarian state. At random check points Uighur are force to surrender cell 
phones from which all data can be downloaded in a matter of seconds; Uighur are force to 
make audio recordings at such check points—presumably to assist in identification when cell 
phones are tapped; some two million Uighur men were ordered to surrender their international 
passports, effectively undermining the right to migrate or travel abroad; Uighur businesses are 
forced to sell alcohol, Uighur university students are prohibited from fasting during Ramadan; 
and an estimated 5% of the Uighur population has been detained in mass ‘re-education’ 
camps, or more accurately gulags.27 Too be sure, the mass surveillance state exists in other 
                                                            
21 See James Millward, Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2009). See also James Millward’s recent op-ed, “What its Like to Live in a Surveillance State,” New York 
Times, Feb 3rd, 2018. 
22 Tania Branigan, “Ethnic Violence in China Leaves 140 Dead,” The Guardian, July 6th, 2009.  
23 Jonathan Kaimen, “Islamist Group Claims Responsibility for Attack on Tiananman Square,” The Gaurdian, 
Nov. 25th, 2003.  
24 Hanna Beech, “Deadly Terrorist Attack in Southwestern China Blamed on Separatist Muslim Uighurs,” Time, 
March 2nd, 2014.  
25 Edward Wong, “Teenager Arrested in Killing of Imam in Western China,” New York Times, August 25th, 
2014.  
26 Reuters in Beijing, “Xinjiang Attack: four ‘terrorists’ and one bystander killed, says China,” December 29th, 
2016. 
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regions too, including Tibet. Yet by comparison, the scale of the surveillance state in Xinjiang 
is probably unrivaled anywhere on the planet.  
Are these factors relevant to how we frame collective violence by Uighurs in Xin-
jiang? That’s a rhetorical question, of course. But notice that when we frame violence by a 
Muslim population as ‘religious violence’ we are prone to overlooking other possible factors 
that may be more relevant to explaining such violence. And in Xinjiang it is reasonable to 
explore the following hypothesis: the relation between Uighur citizens and the Chinese state 
is a primary cause of support for violence; ethnic and religious identity are the means by 
which support for violence is mobilized. Moreover, we can use the current situation in Xin-
jiang to formulate hypotheses about what might happen in the future, depending on how op-
pressive the surveillance state becomes and how effective it is at repressing resistance to it. 
Total domination would prevent collective and organized violence, but not the will thereto. 
Although internal colonialism differs from traditional colonialism (e.g. the French subjection 
of a Muslim population in Algeria), and of course differs from military occupation by a for-
eign power, there is data which support the claim that violence in the name of an identity, 
religious or otherwise, is frequently triggered by a response to oppression or some source for 
a deep and enduring grievance. In the case of religion, “…countries with the lowest levels of 
religious hostilities have the lowest average levels of religious repression and those at the 
highest levels of hostilities have the highest levels of repression.”28 
There are two reasons this context is useful as an illustration of the central ideas on re-
ligion, identity, and violence that I’ve presented. First, it illustrates the intersectionality prob-
lem. Uighur citizens differ from Han and other Chinese co-nationals along ethnic, religious, 
and linguistic identity markers. Most are Hanafi Sunni Muslim.  Some approaches to collec-
tive violence won’t seriously ask the question, ‘which identity marker is most salient?’ If one 
is predisposed to believe that religious convictions are what motivate collective violence, then 
it’s easy to ignore other variables that might be more salient. Others, such as the Chinese 
state, claim, without providing any evidence, that collective violence in Xinjiang is organized 
by religious extremists and with ties to global jihadists. The case of collective violence by 
Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang is better understood if we adopt the identity approach. If we as-
sume that religion is what motivates violence by a Muslim population, we will not see the 
other factors mentioned above. In fact, organized violence in Xinjiang is arguably a paradigm 
example of violence that is sometimes committed in the name of religion but whose underly-
ing causes are political.   
Secondly, contemporary Uighur identity in Xinjiang is partly an artifact of Chinese 
state power. Identities, religious or otherwise are not formed independently of material condi-
tions.  These conditions include: state policies on religion; state policies on language – in Xin-
jiang Uighur is often written in Arabic script not Mandarin, yet the state actively represses 
Uighur in favor of Mandarin; education policy – which promotes a secular and anti-
multicultural conception of national identity; and economic and status inequalities between 
Han and Uighur citizens. The Chinese state is committed to re-shaping Uighur identity, by 
means of extraordinarily oppressive political power, into an imagined identity deemed more 
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compatible with the Han nationalist agenda as applied in other contexts, most notably Tibet. 
These are key elements in the so-called ‘one China’ policy whereby the state seeks to forge a 
national identity that reflects an imagined national identity in which religion, ethnicity, lan-
guages - are gradually erased as a result of forced assimilation. As Mathew Longo notes in 
The Politics of Borders, when the state worries about citizens along border zones, 
 
...the state's attempt to nationalize the periphery is more than just a security measure designed to 
breed loyalty--it is an attempt to create in its own image the very place farthest from its own like-
ness.29   
 
Longo isn’t considering China when he makes this claim—rather his focus is on Western 
governments, such as the U.S., including efforts by the U.S. to build loyalty among Hispanics 
after the annexation of Texas and the expansion in the southwest. This is an apt description of 
one way a state policy towards a religious or other minority group qualifies as internal coloni-
alism. Modern Uighur identity in China is impacted by this, among other factors. For instance 
major oil fields have been discovered in Xinjiang, a fact that makes energy security another 
factor motivating Chinese state policy in the region.30 
 
IV. Conclusion 
I have proposed an alternative to some influential accounts of violence in the name of reli-
gion.  The New Atheists attribute violence in the name of religion to belief, in particular, be-
lief that is fantastical, delusional, and irrational. We should reject that view. One reason is that 
if we are interested in understanding violence in the name of religion, we want to discover 
ways to reduce such violence. The New Atheists offer no help here.   They may claim that 
reducing violence is not their aim, in which case, fair enough. We can then ask whether their 
project is of any use to political philosophy or other practically oriented projects, and the an-
swer is, no. Second, the social science research on organized violence in the name of religion 
does not support the claim that religious belief is typically the underlying cause of collective 
violence. So even if the New Atheists claim they are not interested in reducing violence, there 
are compelling evidence-based reasons to reject their account of collective violence in the 
name of religion.   
The civilizational approach offers a more plausible framework, in part because it in-
corporates factors such as historical memory, imagined group identities, and intellectual tradi-
tions within the history of a religious doctrine. These are important influences on religious 
identity. Yet proponents of this view construe civilizational identities in ways that are too 
general, sometimes Orientalist and chauvinistic, and frequently exaggerate the role that ideas 
play in explaining conflicts between groups. We need a more fine-grained account of identity 
than what the civilizational approach offers. It is not unfair to characterize the civilizational 
approach as based on a conception of power politics we might glean from reading Thucydi-
des’ History of the Peloponnesian War or storied accounts of European colonialism in the 19th 
C that envision the world as a chessboard on which the great powers determine the fate of the 
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weaker powers.31 There are many factors play a role in how agents politicize their religious 
identity that this approach to conflict ignores. I have combined some ideas from social science 
with philosophical accounts of identity to argue that the religious identity approach is superior 
to the civilizational approach. 
Cavanaugh argues that the idea of religious violence is mostly a myth, resting as it 
does on confused or unhelpful definitions of what counts as religious. Though much of what 
he argues offers a welcome contrast to the New Atheist and the civilizational approaches, 
there are contexts in which assigning the label ‘religious violence’ is apt. For instance, even 
when collective violence in the name of religion is triggered by political factors, such as oc-
cupation, religious identity is a salient variable. We can avoid the pitfalls of New Atheism and 
the civilizational approach, both of which Cavanaugh rightly opposes, without having to jetti-
son entirely the idea of religious violence. For example, a social scientist that seeks to under-
stand interaction effects between ethnic and religious identity markers might discover that 
religious identity is a salient cause for collective violence, but only under special conditions. 
‘Religious violence’ would be an apt label in that context. 
Finally, I hope that this paper can serve as an example of how to approach a complex 
and politically charged issue with the caution and intellectual humility that the subject matter 
demands. Too many accounts of religious violence conflate different species of violence, de-
pend upon anti-religious biases, or enlist self-serving characterizations of religious traditions. 
Responsible scholarship on religion and violence should avoid apologetics as well as punditry.  
                                                            
31 See for example, Peter Hopkirk’s classic, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (New 
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